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Abstract
This Article aims to shed some light on linkage between rules of origin and territorial disputes,
and to analyze the alternative approaches available to policy makers in such cases. The choice
between these alternatives is closely related to the broader subject of the interrelationships between
international trade law and politics, which this Article will also address. It should be emphasized
at the outset that this Article does not aim to address the substantive territorial disputes regarding
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (nor the legality of the settlements located therein), Western
Sahara, Taiwan, Northern Cyprus, or other disputed territories. The aim here is, rather, to explore
the link between the particular position undertaken by a State (or an economic bloc) regarding
the status of the disputed territory and the rules of origin applied to products manufactured in that
territory.
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INTRODUCTION
Rules of origin are not often involved in international terri-
torial disputes. Their ordinary aim is to determine whether a
particular preferential arrangement (e.g., duty-free import) will
be applied to a given product in international trade.' Yet, where
* Arnold Brecht Chair in European Law, Faculty of Law and Department of Inter-
national Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
1. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNA-
RULES OF ORIGIN
products are manufactured in a territorially disputed area, these
rather technical rules of international trade are found at the
forefront of political disputes regarding the status of that area.
The ongoing controversy between the European Union ("EU")
and Israel regarding the origin of goods produced in the Israeli
settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is an exemplary
case of such a link between rules of origin and territorial dis-
putes. This Article aims to shed some light on linkage between
rules of origin and territorial disputes, and to analyze the alter-
native approaches available to policy makers in such cases. The
choice between these alternatives is closely related to the
broader subject of the interrelationships between international
trade law and politics, which this Article will also address.
Rules of origin constitute an essential component of any
preferential trading regime. The surge of regional trade ar-
rangements in the recent decade indicates that the importance
of rules of origin is expected to increase in the coming years.'
The aim of these rules in preferential agreements is to avoid
free-riding by third parties. The parties to such agreements are
interested in reducing trade barriers on a mutual basis, while
maintaining existing external trade protection vis-d-vis non-con-
tracting parties. This rationale also applies to the operation of
the 1995 free-trade-area agreement between the EU and Israel
(the "1995 EU-Israel Agreement").'
TIONAL TRADE 127-28 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the functions of rules of origin in inter-
national trade); Moshe Hirsch, International Trade Law, Political Economy and Rules of
Origin: A Plea for a Reform of the WTO Regime on Rules of Origin, 36(2) J. OF WORLD TRADE
171 (2002); BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 102-04 (1995).
2. Several scholars consider the rapid spread of regional trade arrangements in the
world trading system to be "the most important policy issue in the global trading sys-
tem." SeeJean-Marie Grether, Preferential and Non-Preferential Trade FTows in World Trade 2
(Staff Working Paper ERAD-98-10, World Trade Organization, Economic Research and
Analysis Division, 1998). Most countries in the world, in all parts of the globe, are
members of preferential arrangements and the share of these arrangements in the
world trade is 40%-42%. The majority of the 150 regional trade arrangements that are
currently in effect, have been concluded in the past decade. See World Trade Organiza-
tion, Regionalism (Sept. 5, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/re-
gion-e/region-e.htm; TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra n.1, at 129-34 (discussing the recent
surge in regional trade arrangements); MARKET INTEGRATION, REGIONALISM AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (Richard E. Baldwin, Daniel Cohen, Andre Sapir & Anthony Vena-
bles eds., 1999).
3. Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the Euro-
pean Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of
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The rupture of the peace process in September 2000, and
the ensuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, raised
numerous questions of international law, including many in the
commercial sphere. These questions relate not only to the di-
rect relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority
("PA") but also to the relations between the EU and these par-
ties. The EU is a major trading partner of both rival parties to
the long-standing dispute in the Middle East, and its trade policy
is of major importance for Israel and the PA.4 This explains why
the EU's determination of origin regarding goods produced in
the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is of major
significance to both parties. The determination of origin in this
case is associated with the vexed political dispute regarding sov-
ereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
It should be emphasized at the outset, that this Article does
not aim to address the substantive territorial disputes regarding
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (nor the legality of the settle-
ments located therein), Western Sahara, Taiwan, Northern Cy-
prus, or other disputed territories. The aim here is, rather, to
explore the link between the particular position undertaken by a
State (or an economic bloc) regarding the status of the disputed
territory and the rules of origin applied to products manufac-
tured in that territory.
I. THE FUNCTION OF RULES OF ORIGIN IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Rules of origin function as a differentiating mechanism to
determine whether a particular discriminatory arrangement will
be applied to a given product in international trade. Discrimina-
tory arrangements operate in both directions, providing for ei-
ther preferential or detrimental treatment (e.g., tariff conces-
sions or anti-dumping measures, respectively). As rules of origin
the other part, OJ. L 147/3 (2000) [hereinafter the 1995 EU-Israel Agreement]. See
Moshe Hirsch, The 1995 Trade Agreement Between the European Communities and Israel:
Three Unresolved Issues, 1 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 87-123 (1996) [hereinafter Three Un-
resolved Issues]; Peter Malanczuk, The Legal Framework of the Economic Relations Between
Israel and the European Union, in ISRAEL AMONG NATIONS 263 (Alfred E. Kellermann, Kurt
Siehr, & Talia Einhorn eds., 1998) (both discussing the 1995 EU-Israel Agreement).
4. See Ben R. Soetendorp, The EUs Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Process: The
Building of a Visible International Identity, 7 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 283 (2002) (discussing
the relations between the EU, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority ("PA")).
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constitute an accessory element within a larger discriminatory
system, their relative weight is contingent, to a large measure,
upon the importance of the discriminatory system itself. The sig-
nificance of rules of origin in a preferential arrangement corre-
sponds to the existing gap between the preferential arrangement
and the general Most Favored Nation ("MFN") regime.5 Over-
all, current trends in international commerce, particularly the
accelerated spread of preferential arrangements outside the
MFN regime, indicate that the weight of rules of origin is likely
to grow in the coming decades.
The determination of origin does not present special diffi-
culties when the product is "wholly obtained or produced" in
one State.' Unfortunately, with the increasing trend that has
been labeled as the "global factory,"7 most final products in con-
temporary international commerce involve factors of production
from more than one country. Well-known examples are com-
puters and automobiles. In such cases, rules of origin are de-
signed to identify which of the States involved is the "originating
State." The general principle widely accepted in international
trade law is that the State carrying out the "last substantial pro-
cess" or "sufficient working or processing" is the originating
State .8
5. See Moshe Hirsch, The Asymmetric Incidence of Rules of Origin: Will Progressive and
Cumulation Rules Resolve the Problem?, 32J. OF WORLD TRADE 41, 42-44 (1998) (discussing
the relative importance of rules of origin in various settings) [hereinafter Asymmetric
Incidence].
6. Still, some rules (relatively uncomplicated) are commonly included in preferen-
tial agreements to define products "wholly obtained" in a certain State. See, e.g., 1995
EU-Israel Agreement, supra n.3, Protocol 4, art. 4, O.J. L 147/3 at 51 (2000); North
American Free Trade Agreement, 32 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 289, art. 415 (1993)
("NAFTA"); 1973 International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization
of Customs Procedures, 950 U.N.T.S. 269, Annex D.A, rule 2, O.J. L 166/3 (1977) ("Ky-
oto Convention").
7. SeeJacques HJ. Bourgeois, Rules of Origin: An Introduction, in RULES OF ORIGIN
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1, 4-5 (Edwin Vermulst, Paul Waer & Jacques Bourgeois eds.,
1994) (discussing this trend).
8. The term "last substantial process" is used in non-preferential contexts. See, e.g.,
WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin, THE LEGAL TEXTS - THE RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 241, arts. 3(b) and 9(b) (1994)
[hereinafter 1994 WTO Agreement]; Council Regulation 2193/92, art. 23, O.J. L 302/1
(1992) (establishing the Community Customs Code). The term "sufficient working or
processing" is used in numerous preferential agreements. See, e.g., 1995 EU-Israel
Agreement, supra n.3, Protocol 4, art. 5, O.J. L 147/3 at 52 (2000). See also Paul Waer,
European Community Rules of Origin, in RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra
n.7, at 85, 146 (discussing the rules of origin included in agreements concluded by the
2003]
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The principle of the "last substantial process" and "suffi-
cient processing" is vague and leaves wide discretion to national
customs authorities. This feature generates an undesirable situa-
tion of uncertainty and undermines predictability for traders.
Three economic tests are employed to define the general princi-
ple more precisely:
(i) a domestic content test, requiring a minimum percentage of
local value added in the originating State (or setting the max-
imum percentage of value originating in non-Member
States);
(ii) a technical test, prescribing that the product must undergo
specific processing operations in the originating State; and
(iii) a change in tariff classification, requiring the product to
change its tariff heading under the Harmonized Commodity
Description System ("Harmonized System") in the originat-
ing State.9
In sum, rules of origin are primarily designed to facilitate
trade liberalization through reciprocal arrangements. This
method is implemented through preferential agreements that
are intended to allow trade concessions only to the contracting
parties, while maintaining existing barriers towards non-con-
tracting parties.
II. THE OPERATION OF RULES OF ORIGIN IN TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES: TWO ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Rules of origin are commonly perceived as important, but
rather "technical," rules of international trade law. Applying
these rules to goods produced in disputed territories, however, is
likely to constitute a source of political friction. Such interna-
tional settings are characterized by disagreements regarding the
issue of sovereignty over a particular territory or with respect to
recognition of a certain government.
Rules of origin are relevant to territorial disputes because
the origin of goods is commonly defined in international trade
EU); Ian S. Forrester, EEC Customs Law: Rules of Origin and Preferential Duty Treatment -
Part , 5 EUR. L. REv. 167, 179-80 (1980).
9. SeeJOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 167-69 (2d ed. 1997); Edwin
A. Vermulst, Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments - Revisited, 26 J. OF WORLD
TRADE 61, 63-74 (1992); Joseph A. LaNasa II, Rules of Origin and the Uruguay Round's
Effectiveness in Harmonizing and Regulating Them, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 625, 629-36 (1996)
(all discussing these tests in detail).
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law on a territorial basis. Ordinarily, only products that are man-
ufactured within a particular State are eligible to benefit from
the preferences accorded to that State. Consequently, the deter-
mination of origin of a product may involve a prior decision re-
garding whether the particular product has been manufactured
within or outside of the exporting State. A similar question
arises with regard to the competence of unrecognized govern-
ments to issue valid certificates of origin. Where the exported
goods are produced in a disputed territory, rules of origin are
suddenly found at the heart of the international political battle.
Territorial disputes are not so rare in the international
arena (e.g., Cyprus, Kashmir, Taiwan, Tibet, and Western Sa-
hara), and importing States that encounter such situations may
pursue one of two alternative approaches:
(i) The practical-trade approach considers the issue of origin
from a commercial perspective and resolves the relevant
questions in accordance with rules of international trade law
that emphasize the factors of defacto control,jurisdiction, and
ensuing responsibility. This course of action seeks to mini-
mize the role of political factors in the operation of rules of
origin;
(ii) The political-sovereignty approach considers the issue of ori-
gin from an international political perspective, underlines the
involved questions of sovereignty and recognition, and ad-
dresses the question of origin as flowing from an early deter-
mination regarding the questions of sovereignty or recogni-
tion.
A. The Practical-Trade Approach
This approach addresses the issue of origin as a question of
international trade law. The point of departure for this ap-
proach is that treaty provisions should be interpreted in light of
their ordinary meaning, as arising from their particular context
and object. This canon of interpretation is included in the 1969
Convention on the Law of Treaties"° and has been widely em-
ployed by the World Trade Organization ("WTO") tribunals.1
10. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 8 I.L.M. 679.
See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 1266-75 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992) (discussing this principle of interpretation).
11. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF THE PANEL: UNITED STATES
SECTION 301-310 OF THE TRADE AcT OF 1974, paras. 7.58-7.72 (Dec. 22, 1999), available
20031
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Trade treaties, such as the free-trade-areas agreements, are
ordinarily aimed at liberalizing trade relations between the con-
tracting parties, and not at determining the legal status of a cer-
tain territory. Consequently, interpretation of the relevant rules
of origin included in such agreements should not be based on
the various rules regarding sovereignty, acquisition of territory,
or international recognition, but rather, on factual factors like de
facto control, jurisdiction, and ensuing international responsibil-
ity.
Support for the practical-trade approach is found in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") rules and
practice. Questions regarding the application of trade agree-
ments to disputed territories have arisen several times in GATT
history and they are addressed in Article XXVI(5) (a) of the
GATT. This Article provides as follows:
Each government accepting this Agreement does so in re-
spect of its metropolitan territory and of the other territories for
which it has international responsibility, except such separate cus-
toms territories as it shall notify to the Executive Secretary to
the CONTRACTING PARTIES at the time of its own accept-
ance. 1
2
This GATT principle directs our attention to the question of
which State is internationally responsible for the relevant terri-
tory, rather than the question of who is the sovereign over the
particular territory.
This separation of the issue of the application of the trading
arrangements to disputed territories from the issue of their legal
status under public international law was further upheld in
GATT practice. When Portugal sought to accede to the GATT in
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispti-e/dispustatns-e.htm. See also David
Palmeter & Petros Mavroidis, The WI'O Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
398, 406 (2001 );Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WIO: How Far
Can We Go?, 95 Am. J. INT'L L. 535, 573-76 (2001) (both discussing the application of
the interpretation rules, including the Vienna Convention, by the WTO tribunals).
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 7 (1994) [hereinafter GATT] (emphasis
added). An interpretative note to this Article regarding military occupation was deleted
in the Review Session of 1954-1955. The former note provided that territories for which
the contracting parties have international responsibility do not include areas under mil-
itary occupation. The deletion of this interpretative note became effective on October
7, 1957. GUIDE TO GATT LXW AND PRACTICE: ANALYTICAL INDEX 852-53, 858 (6th ed.
1994) [hereinafter GATT LAW AND PRACTICE].
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1961, the question regarding the application of the GATT to
some of its "overseas provinces" generated concerns in India.
The representative of India sought clarification of the relation-
ship between Portugal and these territories. The GATT Execu-
tive Secretary replied that:
[H]e was satisfied that in adopting the text which was pro-
posed.., the CONTRACTING PARTIES would not be taking
any position with respect to the international status of these
territories. Contracting parties were concerned only with what was
relevant to the General Agreement, which were the trading arrange-
ments proposed with respect to these territories and not their status in
international law. Therefore, the approval of this protocol
would not, in [his] view, in any way affect or conflict with
whatever decisions might be taken or had been taken by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, on these legal mat-
ters. 13
A similar question arose in the GATT system in 1965 with
regard to the disputed sovereignty over Antarctica.14 Following
the issuance of a list of countries and territories where the Gen-
eral Agreement was effective, the United States formally stated in
1965 that it did not recognize the claims of sovereignty regard-
ing the territory of Antarctica and reserved all rights with respect
to that territory.
15
The practical-trade approach was also adopted by the EU 16
with regard to goods imported from the disputed territory of
Taiwan.17 The EU and its Member States do not recognize the
Republic of China (Taiwan) as a sovereign State. Rather, they
consider it a province of the State of China.18 Notwithstanding
13. GATT LAw AND PRACTICE, supra n.12, at 852 (emphasis added).
14. See Rudiger Wolfrum & Ulf-Dieter Kehnn, Antarctica, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992) (discussing the legal dis-
pute regarding the status of Antarctica).
15. GATT LAW AND PRAcrICE, supra n.12, at 852.
16. A different approach was undertaken by the EU with regard to products manu-
factured in northern Cyprus and the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. See discussion infra in Section II.B. of this Article.
17. SeeJonathan I. Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-Strait Relations Between
China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 453 (2000) (discussing the dispute regarding the
status of Taiwan under international law).
18. See, e.g., The EU's relations with Taiwan (Chinese Taipei): Overview, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external-relations/taiwan/intro/index.htm. See also Ste-
phan Talmon, The Cyprus Question Before the European Court of Justice, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L.
727, 747 (2001).
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this non-recognition, the EU law allows the import of some prod-
ucts from Taiwan to the EU, accompanied by a certificate of ori-
gin issued by competent Taiwanese authorities (and not necessa-
rily by the People's Republic of China). For example, EU Com-
mission Regulation 1084/95 states that garlic originating in
Taiwan must be accompanied by a certificate of origin issued by
a competent governmental authority of the country of origin
upon importation. 9
Similarly, the EU has, apparently, applied the practical-
trade approach to goods from Western Sahara. Western Sahara
is not considered to be under the sovereignty of Morocco in ac-
cordance with international law,"' but the latter State has taken
control of nearly all of the area.2 ' The Moroccan government
controls Western Saharan trade and economic activities.22 The
EU-Morocco Agreement does not contain any express provision
on the question of Western Sahara, but Article 94 provides that
the Agreement "shall apply ... to the territory of the Kingdom
of Morocco. ' 23 Still, the EU apparently also applies the trade
preferences included in the EU-Morocco Agreement to goods
produced in Western Sahara and imported into the EU.24
B. The Political-Sovereignty Approach
The alternative approach available to policy makers regard-
19. Commission Regulation No. 1084/95, art. 2, O.J. L 109/1 (1995) (abolishing
the protective measure applicable to imports of garlic originating in Taiwan and replac-
ing it with a certificate of origin). The authority listed in the Annex to this Regulation
is the Bureau of Commodity Inspection & Quarantine, Ministry of Economic Affairs for
Export & Import. Certificates are issued on behalf of the Ministry of Economic Affairs,
Republic of China. Id.; see Talmon, supra n.18, at 747-48 (discussing this Regulation).
20. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (providing the International Court of Jus-
tice's decision on this issue); Thilo Marauhn, Sahara, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 283 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000) (discussing the various aspects of
the dispute regarding the status of Western Sahara).
21. See, e.g., D.J. HARRIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 118-19 (5th ed. 1998).
22. Shari Berke, Sahara Dispute and Environment, in ICE CASE STUDIES 1 (1997),
available at http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/sahara.html.
23. Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the Euro-
pean Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of
Morocco, of the other part, OJ. L 70/2 (2000) [hereinafter EU-Morocco Agreement].
24. Interview with EU official in Brussels, Jan. 13, 2003 (on file with author). The
EU official site that reviews the relations between the two parties describes the "surface"
of the Kingdom of Morocco as "710,850 sq. km (including the territory of Western Sahara)"
(emphasis added); The EUs Relations with Morocco: Overview, available at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/external-relations/morocco/intro/index.htm.
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ing the question of the origin of goods produced in the disputed
territories, is to consider this subject from the political perspec-
tive and to emphasize the issues of sovereignty and international
recognition. This approach accords considerable importance to
prior determination regarding sovereignty or recognition with
regard to a particular territory, and this earlier stage overshad-
ows the process of determination of origin. Under this ap-
proach, the State that is identified as the "sovereign State" is the
State of origin, and only a recognized government is authorized
to issue certificates of origin.
The process of determining who is the sovereign or the rec-
ognized government in a disputed territory may employ the
rules of general international law regarding the acquisition of
territory, international recognition (of States or governments),
and pertinent decisions of international organizations (e.g., the
United Nations ("U.N.") Security Council and General Assem-
bly) and international tribunals (e.g., the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ")).
In addition to sources of international law, internal tribu-
nals that deal with questions of sovereignty or recognition are
likely to take into account the political position adopted by their
governments in the particular cases. As to recognition of foreign
States, for instance, the English courts have adopted the attitude
over many years "that an entity unrecognized by the Foreign Of-
fice would be treated before the courts as if did not exist. '25 As
for governmental decisions whether or not to grant recognition,
"[p]olitical considerations have usually played a large role" in
such decisions.2 6
These well-known effects of political considerations upon
decisions regarding sovereignty and recognition indicate that
the political-sovereignty approach is highly susceptible to the in-
fluence of the political positions of the relevant government with
regard to the disputed territory. The determination of origin in
such cases may constitute a transmission belt between the for-
eign policy of the relevant State (or economic block) and its
25. MALCOLM SHOW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 318-19 (4th ed. 1997) (referencing court
decisions cited therein).
26. Id. at 304. The author also observes that "[i]t is stating the obvious to point to
the very strong political influences that bear upon this topic. In more cases than not,
the decision whether or not to recognize will depend more on political considerations
than upon exclusively legal factors." Id. at 295.
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trade policy. The political-sovereignty approach may constitute
an instrument for exerting pressure upon States that illegally re-
tain control over a disputed territory but, as discussed in detail in
Section IV of this Article, the approach also blurs the valuable
distinction between international trade rules and foreign policy.
Support for the political-sovereignty approach is found in
the case law of the EU Court of Justice regarding certificates of
origin for products manufactured in the disputed territory of the
northern part of Cyprus,2 7 as well as in the practice of the EU
with respect to the origin of goods produced in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip. The EU Court judgment in Anastasiou P
involved the interpretation of the 1972 Association Agreement
between the European Economic Community and the Republic
of Cyprus ("EEC-Cyprus Agreement") .21 Products that originate
in Cyprus are entitled to benefit from certain preferential ar-
rangements included in the EEC-Cyprus Agreement and the
Protocols thereto. Article 6(1) of the Protocol on Rules of Ori-
gin (concluded in 1977) stated that evidence of the originating
status of products was to be given by movement certificate
"EUR.l." Articles 7(1) and 8(1) of this Protocol specified that
the certificate of origin was to be issued by the customs authori-
ties of the exporting State.:"
The particular products in this case - citrus fruits and pota-
toes - were imported from the northern part of Cyprus, which
was under the control of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cy-
prus ("TRNC"), into the United Kingdom ("UK"). The UK cus-
toms authorities had refused to accept certificates of origin ac-
companying goods issued by, or bearing customs stamps refer-
ring to, the TRNC. The British authorities, however, accepted
certificates that bore stamps in the name of the Cyprus Customs
27. See Thomas Opperman, Cyprus, in 1 ENCVCLOPF IIA OF PUBLIC INTFRNATIONAL
Lxw, supra n. 14, at 923 (discussing the legal status of the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus ("TRNC")).
28. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex pare S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri)
Ltd. and Others, Case C-432/92, [1994] E.C.R. 3087. Compare The International Practice
of the European Communities: Current Survey Re. Cypriot Import Certificates, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L.
120 (1996), and Nicholas Emiliou, Current Suruey: Cypriot Import Certificates - Some Hot
Potatoes, 20 EUR. L. REv. 202 (1995) (both discussing thisjudgment), with Talnon, supra
n.18 (criticizing this judgment).
29. Agreement of December 1972 Establishing an Association Between the Euro-
pean Community and the Republic of Cyprus, O.J. L 133/1 (1973).
30. Anastasiou I, [1994] E.C.R. at 3120-21 (addressing the parallel question re-
garding the issuance of phytosanitary certificates).
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Authority, which indicated that they were not issued by the au-
thorities of the Republic of Cyprus.3
The principal question posed to the EU Court of Justice was
whether the 1972 Association Agreement should be interpreted
as precluding acceptance by the EU Member States of products
from the northern part of Cyprus when accompanied by certifi-
cates of origin issued by authorities other than the competent
authorities of the Republic of Cyprus.3 2 The UK and the EU
Commission contended that the special situation in Cyprus al-
lowed the EU members to accept certificates of origin issued not
by the government of the Republic of Cyprus, but by the Turkish
community in the northern part of Cyprus. 3 The UK and the
Commission maintained that:
Given the special situation of Cyprus... defacto acceptance of
the certificates in question issued by authorities other than
the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus is cer-
tainly not tantamount to recognition of the TRNC as a State,
but represents the necessary and justifiable corollary of the
need to take the interest of the whole population of Cyprus
into account.34
The EU Court rejected the contentions presented by the
UK and the Commission, and ruled that the defacto partition of
the territory of Cyprus, as a result of the intervention of the
Turkish armed forces in 1975, did not "warrant a departure from
the clear, precise and unconditional provisions of the 1977 Pro-
tocol on the origin of products .... The Court explained that
the Agreement's system of certificates of origin was founded on
mutual reliance and cooperation between the competent au-
thorities of the exporting and importing parties. Consequently,
the Court concluded:
A system of that kind cannot, therefore, function properly un-
less the procedures for administrative cooperation are strictly
complied with. However, such cooperation is excluded with
the authorities of any entity such as that established in the
northern part of Cyprus, which is recognized neither by the Com-
munity nor by the Member States; the only Cypriot State recognized is
31. Id. at 3122.
32. Id. at 3125.
33. Id. at 3129-30.
34. Id. at 3130.
35. Id. at 3131.
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the Republic of Cyprus.3 6
The facts regarding international recognition (given to the
Republic of Cyprus, and the lack thereof regarding the TRNC)
were acknowledged by the Court in several paragraphs of this
judgment.7 Generally, this judgment downplays the commer-
cial aspects of the EU-Morocco Agreement and emphasizes the
issue of international recognition. A more practical approach
was undertaken by the EU Court in Anastasiou II with regard to
phytosanitary certificates (required under the EU legislation) for
goods produced in the northern part of Cyprus and imported
via Turkey to the EU.38
The EU policy regarding goods produced in the Israeli set-
tlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip well illustrates the
political-sovereignty approach.
III. THE EU POLICY ON PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED IN
SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND
THE GAZA STRIP
A. The 1995 EU-Israel Agreement
The conclusion of the 1995 EU-Israel Agreement was con-
sidered a significant development in the relations between the
parties. 9 The Agreement's provisions constitute the legal point
of departure for the controversy between Israel and the EU re-
garding the origin of products manufactured in the Israeli settle-
ments in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The provisions of Title II of the Agreement, together with
the relevant Annex and Protocols, constitute the core of the
1995 EU-Israel Agreement. Article 6(1) provides that:
36. Id. at 3131-32 (emphasis added).
37. See, e.g., id. at 3122, 3133-34.
38. R. v. Minster for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. Anastasiou (Pis-
souri), Ltd., Case C-210/98, [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 339 (the relevant certificates in the pre-
sent case were required by the EC legislation and were issued by a governmental agency
of Turkey, and not by the Republic of Cyprus). See also [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 469 (the
decision of the United Kingdom ("UK") House of Lords).
39. See Ephraim Ahiram & Alfred Tovias, Introduction to WHITHER EU-ISRAEL RELA-
TIONS: COMMON AND DIVERGENT INTERESTS I (Ephraim Ahiram & Alfred Tovias, eds.,
1995) (discussing the relations between the EU and Israel prior to the 1995 Agree-
ment); Daphna Kapeliuk-Klinger, A Legal Analysis of the Free Trade Agreement Between the
European Community and the State of Israel, 27 ISRAEL L. REV. 415 (1995) (discussing the
1975 trade agreement between the EU and Israel).
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The free trade area between the Community and Israel shall
be reinforced according to the modalities set out in this
Agreement and in conformity with the provisions of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 and of other
multilateral agreements on trade in goods annexed to the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. '....4
As in other free-trade-areas agreements, Article 8 of the
1995 EU-Israel Agreement prohibits the imposition of customs
duties on imports and exports, and any charges having
equivalent effect. Quantitative restrictions on imports and ex-
ports and measures having the equivalent effect are also prohib-
ited in trade between the parties. 4' The parties are to refrain
from discriminatory internal fiscal measures and practices, and
their products may not benefit from indirect internal tax repay-
ments in excess of the tax actually paid. 42 Different, and gener-
ally more restrictive rules are applied to trade in agricultural
products between the parties.43
These concessions apply only to products originating in the
parties to the Agreement. As to the territorial application of the
Agreement, Article 83 provides as follows:
This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territo-
ries in which the Treaties establishing the European Commu-
nity and the European Coal and Steel Community are ap-
plied and under the conditions laid down in those Treaties
and, on the other hand, to the territory of the State of Israel.
Rules of origin are set out specifically in Protocol 4. Article 2 of
the Protocol makes a distinction between products "wholly ob-
tained" and those that have undergone "sufficient working or
processing" in either the Community or Israel.44 Article 4 of this
40. 1995 EU-Israel Agreement, art. 6(1), Oj. L 147/3, at 5 (2000).
41. Id. art. 16-17, O.J. L 147/3, at 6 (2000).
42. Id. art. 19, O.J. L 147/3, at 5 (2000).
43. See id. art. 10-15, O.J. L 147/3, at 6 (2000); id. Protocols 1, 2, O.J. L 147/3, at
35, 43 (2000). See also Three Unresolved Issues, supra n.3, at 111-22 (providing a detailed
analysis of the agricultural trade regime between the parties).
44. 1995 EU-Israel Agreement, supra n.3, Protocol 4, art. 2, O.. L 147/3, at 50
(2000) provides:
For the purpose of implementing the Agreement ... the following products
shall be considered as:
1. products originating in the Community: ...
2. products originating in Israel:
(a) products wholly obtained in Israel within the meaning of Article 4
of this Protocol;
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Protocol includes detailed rules regarding products "wholly ob-
tained" in Israel or the EU and Article 5, as well as Annex II,
elaborate on the origin requirements applicable to products that
involve factors of production from more than one contracting
party ("mixed products"). Article 6 includes a negative list of
insufficient working or processing operations that do not entitle
a product to be covered by the Agreement.
B. The Origin of Products Manufactured in the Settlements in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip
The Israeli settlements located in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip are at the heart of the legal and political dispute be-
tween Israel, the Palestinians, and the EU. These territories
were seized by Israel during the Six Day War in 1967 and, aside
from East Jerusalem45 and the Golan Heights,46 are considered
to be outside the borders of Israel in accordance with Israeli law.
The legal status of these territories, and the legality or illegality
of the settlements located therein, are debated among States
and scholars.47 As stated in the Introduction, this Article does
not address these issues but rather, examines the link between
States' positions on these subjects and the rules of origin applied
to products manufactured in the disputed territories.
The value of products that are manufactured in these areas
and exported to the EU States amounts to about US$100 million
a year (while total Israeli exports to the EU amount to US$7-8
billion a year). The amount of customs duties applied to these
products (if disqualified for the free-trade-area's privileges) is as-
sessed at US$7 million a year." Among the products manufac-
(b) products obtained in Israel which contain materials not wholly ob-
tained there, provided that the said materials have undergone suf-
ficient working or processing in Israel within the meaning of Arti-
cle 5 of this Protocol.
Id.
45. See MOSHE HIRSCH, DEBORAH HOUSEN COURIEL & RUTH LAPIDOTH, WIHITHER
JERUSALEM? PROPOSALS AND POSITIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM 1-21
(1995) (discussing the dispute regarding the status of East Jerusalem under interna-
tional law).
46. The Golan Heights (that were seized from Syria in 1967) were annexed to
Israel by the Golan Heights Law in 1981. Golan Heights Law, 36 L.S.I. 7 (1981).
47. See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 107-48 (1993)
(discussing the various positions regarding the legal status of the Israeli settlements).
48. Ora Coren, EU Duties on Green Line Goods Days Away, HA'ARETZ (English ed.),
Oct. 15, 2002, at 2.
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tured in these settlements and exported to the EU are carbon-
ated drinks, wines from the Golan Heights, cosmetic products
derived from the Dead Sea minerals, juice from West Bank, and
oranges and flowers from the Gaza Strip."
The principal contentious question here is whether goods
produced in the settlements are entitled to the trade benefits
provided for in the 1995 EU-Israel Agreement. The EU Com-
mission examined this question and concluded that these prod-
ucts are not eligible for preferential treatment under the Agree-
men t.51 ' The EU's legal reasoning is articulated in the 1998
Commission's Communication which provides a straightforward
interpretation of the Agreement's provisions. As explained in
this Communication, the EU-Israel Agreement specifies that it
applies to the territories of the Member States of the European
Community and "to the territory of the State of Israel.' Conse-
quently, the "question arises whether Israeli settlements ... are
part of the State of Israel?"52 The answer provided by the EU
Commission to this question is that "[aill relevant United Na-
tions Security Council Resolutions lead to the conclusion that
neither Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, nor
EastJerusalem and the Golan Heights, can be considered as part
of the State of Israel. 53
The Communication cites several Resolutions of the Secur-
ity Council, General Assembly, and other declarations issued by
the EU. This straightforward logic led the Commission to the
seemingly unavoidable conclusion that "[p] referential access to
Community markets for exports originating in Israeli settlements
... would contravene agreed rules of origin."54 This legal rea-
49. William A. Orme Jr., Europe Warns Israel of Limits on Some Duty-Free Goods, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 2001; Aluf Benn, EU to Tax Goods from Outside Green Line, HA'ARETZ (En-
glish ed.), May 21, 2001, at 1.
50. See Notice to Importers: Imports from Israel into the Community, Nov. 23,
2001, O. C 328/04 (2001) (stating ". . it is now confirmed that Israel issues proofs of
origin for products coming from places brought under the Israeli administration since
1967, which, according to the Community, are not entitled to benefit from preferential
treatment under the Agreements.").
51. The Commission's Communication cites Article 38 of the EC-Israel Interim
Agreement that is reproduced in Article 83 of the 1995 EU-Israel Agreement. Imple-
mentation of the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-Related Matters between the
European Community and Israel 7, SEC (1998) 695 final (June 1998).
52. Id. at 7.
53. id.
54. Id. at 8.
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soning has been adopted by the EU representatives and repre-
sents the EU's official policy on this issue.55
The above EU policy relies heavily on the status of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip and is in line with the political-sover-
eignty approach to the determination of origin of goods pro-
duced in disputed areas. This policy is appraised in the next
section.
C. Appraisal: The Hazards of the Political-Sovereignty Approach
The EU policy regarding goods produced in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip well exemplifies the perils of the political-
sovereignty approach to the determination of origin. The incon-
sistencies presented by the EU practice with regard to disputed
areas, expose it to criticism concerning the link between legal
and foreign policies. As discussed in detail in Section III, the EU
policy regarding the origin of goods produced in disputed terri-
tories is not uniform. The EU policy toward products from Tai-
wan, and apparently also from Western Sahara, is closer to the
practical-trade approach that seeks to avoid the disputed ques-
tions regarding sovereignty or international recognition.56 On
the other hand, the EU policy regarding the origin of goods pro-
duced in the northern part of Cyprus, and in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, is based upon prior determinations regarding the
issue of sovereignty or international recognition. The latter pol-
icy is in line with the political-sovereignty approach. 7
The EU policy regarding the origin of goods produced in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was not consistent over time,
but dependent upon political developments. As explained by
the EU highest officials, the decision to raise the subject of ori-
gin of these products in 1998 (in contrast to its prior practice),51
was triggered by the behavior of Israel's Prime Minister at that
time (Mr. Netanyahu) and the lack of progress in the peace pro-
55. See, e.g., Chris Patten, Statement on Situation in the Middle East (May 16,
2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speec
h01_222.htm; Orme, supra n.49.
56. See discussion infra in Section II.A. of this Article.
57. See discussion infra in Sections II.A. and III.B. of this Article.
58. See, e.g., More Intifada Fallout, BUSINESS WEEK (Int'l ed.), May 21, 2001, at 30
(discussing the prior practice of the EU regarding the origin of goods produced in the
settlements).
RULES OF ORIGIN
cess between Israel and the PA."9
The EU policy regarding goods manufactured in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip is based upon an interpretation of the
1995 EU-Israel Agreement in light of the U.N. Resolutions re-
garding the status of these areas.60 This interpretation overlooks
the commercial character of the relevant provisions. The omis-
sion is conspicuous in light of Article 6 of the Agreement, which
states that this "free trade area.., shall be reinforced according
to the modalities set out in this Agreement and in conformity
with the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade . . 6 As discussed above, GATT rules and practice are
in line with the practical-trade approach. The relevant provi-
sions of the 1995 EU-Israel Agreement and the rules of origin
therein, sought to reinforce the free trade area between these
parties, and not to predetermine the controversial questions re-
garding the legal status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
(which were left by Israel and the Palestinians to the final status
negotiations).
As discussed above, GATT rules and practices point out that
the issue of territorial application of trading arrangements
should be resolved in accordance with the principle of interna-
tional responsibility, rather than the principles of public interna-
tional law regarding sovereignty or international recognition.62
The 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement provides that
"Israel will continue to exercise powers and responsibilities" in
several areas, including the settlements. 63 These provisions, and
the defacto control of Israel over the settlements, point out that
Israel bears international responsibility for these settlements.64
59. Interview with Manuel Marin, former EU Commissioner responsible for rela-
tions with Mediterranean countries. SeeJudy Dempsey, EU Commissioner Criticizes Israelis,
FIN. TIMES, May 27, 1998, at 11; Nitzan Horowitz, The European Union: No More Political
dialogue with Israel, Ha'aretz (Hebrew ed.), May 26, 1998, at 1-2 (author's trans.). See
also Ora Coren, The Ambassador of the European Union: Without Renewal of the Peace Process
- We Will Impose Customs on Import from the Territories, HA'ARETZ (Hebrew ed.), Mar. 5,
2003, at C-4 (author's trans.).
60. See discussion infra in Section III.B. of this Article.
61. See 1995 EU-Israel Agreement, art. 6, O.J. L 147/3, at 6 (2000).
62. See discussion infra in Section II.A. of this Article.
63. See 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, 36 I.L.M. 551, art. I(1), XVII (1997).
64. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Responsibility for the Protection of Human Rights Under the
Interim Israeli-Palestinian Agreements, 28 ISRAEL L. REV. 307-09 (1994); MOSHE HIRSCH,
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TOWARD THIRD PARTIES: SOME
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The EU could have accompanied a policy that follows this legal
and factual situation with a declaration stating that the imple-
mentation of this policy would not prejudice the question of sov-
ereignty over these areas.
The above inconsistencies in the EU policy regarding the
origin of goods from disputed areas, and the almost complete
ignorance of the trade character of the relevant provisions of the
1995 EU-Israel Agreement, generate concerns that this policy
was influenced by the EU's foreign policy. Bearing in mind the
above discussion on the susceptibility of the political-sovereignty
approach to foreign policy influences, 65 it is reasonable to ex-
pect that the EU policy regarding goods produced in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip will be in line with the EU's foreign
policy position regarding the status of these areas and the legal-
ity of these settlements."6 The desirable approach to the deter-
mination of origin of goods manufactured in the disputed terri-
tories is discussed in the following section of this Article.
IV. RULES OF ORIGIN AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN LEGAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS
The analysis of the two alternative approaches to the deter-
mination of origin of products manufactured in territorially dis-
puted areas relates to the broader question regarding the inter-
relationships between foreign policy, trade policy, and interna-
tional trade law. The link between foreign and trade policies is
one of the essential elements of the current international trad-
ing system, and this connection is the underlying assumption of
BASIC PRINCIPLES 76-77 (1995) (both discussing the link between effective control and
international responsibility).
65. See discussion infra in Section lI.B. of this Article.
66. See, e.g., Declaration of the European Union, Second Meeting of the Associa-
tion Council EU-Israel, 14271/01 (Presse 433) (Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://
ue.eu.int/Newsroom. The Declaration stated that:
[t]he EU is concerned about the continuing Israeli settlement activities. Set-
tlements are illegal under international law and constitute a major obstacle to
peace, and the EU is concerned that intensive construction within exiting set-
tlements, as well as establishment of new settlement outposts, continue tn-
abated. The EU strongly urges the Israeli government to reverse its settlement
policy as regards the Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem, and to
put an immediate end to all settlement activities.
/d.; The European Council Declaration on the Middle East, 6 E.C. BULL. 10 (1980)
[hereinafter Venice Declaration]; Ralph Atkins & Peter Norman, EU Puts Peace Onus on
Israel, FIN. TIMES or LONDON, May 17, 2001, at I.
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scholars dealing with international political economy.67 The
employment of trade measures to further political ends is rea-
sonable in an era in which the use of force is significantly cur-
tailed by international norms. Even from the point of view of
the international community at large, this link is desirable in
some cases (e.g., imposition of trade sanctions by the Security
Council to deter extensive human rights violations).
The interrelationship between political processes and inter-
national trade law is more problematic than the link between
political and trade policies. The rules of international trade law,
as of international law in general, are not shaped in a political
vacuum and some political influences are inevitable. 68 Gener-
ally, such political impacts are more legitimate (and visible) in
the process of creation of legal rules, than in the process of their
implementation. Legal rules, once agreed upon and formu-
lated, are fundamentally different from changing patterns in for-
eign policy. While international law interacts with international
politics in various respects, it retains an essential autonomy from
political processes.6 9
Legal rules are designed to enhance certainty and predict-
ability in a particular realm of international interaction. These
attributes of the rules of law are vital to the development and
expansion of the international economic system. The recent
trend of increasing "legalization" (or "rule-oriented diplo-
macy")7" is noticeable in the multilateral trading system, 7 as well
as in world politics in general.72 While the implementation of
67. See, e.g., Roger Tooze, International Political Economy in the Age of Globalization, in
THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS 212, 215 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 1997).
68. See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 88-98 (2d
ed. 1979) (discussing the various interactions between international law and interna-
tional politics).
69. See Andrew Hurrel, International Law and the Changing Constitution of Interna-
tional Society, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL RELA'rIONS 327, 331 (Michael Byers
ed., 2000) (discussing this autonomy).
70. SeeJOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 85-86 (1991) (discussing the difference between "power
oriented" and "rule oriented" diplomacy in international economic relations).
71. See Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade
Relations, 17 Nw.j. INrr'L L. & Bus. 775 (1997) (discussing the legalization of the inter-
national trading system).
72. See Kenneth W. Abbott et al. The Concept of Legalization, International Organiza-
tion, 54(3) INT'L ORG. 401-19 (2000); Miles Kahler, Conclusions: The Causes and Conse-
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international trade rules is inevitably to a certain degree influ-
enced by foreign policy considerations, it is plain that significant
politicization is bound to undermine certainty in the interna-
tional economic system. Such a trend, if materialized, is likely to
weaken the predictability of trading parties, destabilize trading
relations, and hinder long-term development of international
trade. These weighty considerations call to minimize the role of
foreign policy considerations in the implementation of the ex-
isting legal rules of international trade.
Rules of origin are also designed to facilitate the flow of in-
ternational trade in a predictable manner. 7' The WTO Agree-
ment on Rules of Origin reaffirms the need to ensure that rules
of origin are "applied in an impartial, transparent, predictable,
consistent and neutral manner."74 These considerations explain
why the specific tests employed by rules of origin to determine
the origin of goods are of an economic character.
The application of rules of origin to goods produced in ter-
ritorially disputed areas is particularly susceptible to excessive
political influence. This inherent vulnerability, and the ensuing
hazards of subverting the security of legal relations, suggest that
political influence should be minimized in this sphere. Consid-
ering the two alternative approaches to the determination of ori-
gin from this point of view, it is clear that the practical-trade ap-
proach is more desirable. As discussed in detail above, the politi-
cal-sovereignty approach is more receptive to political bias, while
the practical-trade approach is more likely to lessen this undesir-
able impact. The need to ensure neutrality, certainty and pre-
dictability in the application of existing rules of origin, particu-
larly in settings characterized by high political tensions, calls for
a preference for the practical-trade approach.
Finally, it is important to note that new rules of origin,
where agreed upon by the various trading parties, may be em-
ployed as a policy instrument to enhance cooperation and
peaceful relations among rival parties in disputed areas. The cu-
mulation of origin mechanisms allows for the combination of
production factors (raw materials, labor, etc.) of several trading
quences of Legalization, 54(3) INT'L ORG. 661-83 (2000) (both discussing this trend in the
international system).
73. See, e.g., the Second and Sixth Recitals of the Preamble to the 1994 WTO
Agreement, supra n.8; see also discussion infra in Section II of this Article.
74. The Sixth Recital of the Preamble to the 1994 WTO Agreement, supra n.8.
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parties into a unified and larger pool. Establishing a cumulation
arrangement among several parties provides a significant incen-
tive for firms to cooperate in order to reap the benefits of cumu-
lation in their trade with third parties. Thus, the borders of the
cumulated area demarcate an "area of enhanced cooperation. " "
Establishing cumulation rules among rival parties is of par-
ticular importance because commercial cooperation may very
well ameliorate the level of conflict and constitute a precursor to
the development of cooperation in other spheres. A network of
commercial links between individuals and corporations from
States in areas susceptible to armed conflicts, would set a higher
"price" for any party considering the possibility of a conflict.
This outcome of cumulation is likely to strengthen the prospects
for peace in embattled areas like the Middle East. Thus, for in-
stance, it is possible to establish cumulation of origin among
Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan under which the
combined factors of these parties would be deemed to be lo-
cated in each of the parties participating in the enlarged pool.76
CONCLUSION
The preceding sections addressed the application of rules of
origin to products manufactured in territorially disputed areas.
The brief survey of the practice of the GATT members and the
EU showed that two principal alternative options are available to
policy makers in such situations: the practical-trade approach
and the political-sovereignty approach. The discussion of these
alternative options showed that each of these approaches may be
justified by some considerations. The fact that the political-sov-
75. See Asymmetric Incidence, supra n.5, at 52-53 (discussing the "cumulation of ori-
gin" as an instrument to support peaceful relations).
76. Some steps have already been taken by the United States, Jordan, and Israel to
allow cumulation of origin between Jordan and Israel vis-d-vis the United States with
regard to products manufactured in industrial zones. See 1997 Agreement between
Israel and Jordan on Irbid Qualifying Industrial Zone (unpublished) (on file with au-
thor); U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Sec. 9, 19 U.S.C. Sec.
2112; Proclamation No. 6955 of the President of the United States of America. See also
Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"), United States-Israel Free Trade
Area Implementation Act: Designation of Qualifying Industrial Zones, 65(239) FED. REG.
77688-89 (Dec. 12, 2000) (discussing this legislation); MOSHE HIRSCH, ASYMMETRIC FAC-
TOR ENDOWMENTS, PROGRESSIVE RULES OF ORIGIN, AND COMMERCIAL COOPERATION IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 3 (Working Paper, Center for European Studies, Hebrew University,
Jerusalem, 1998) (discussing the EU policy on cumulation of origin among Middle
Eastern States).
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ereignty approach is highly susceptible to the influence of for-
eign policy considerations, however, is likely to undermine legal
certainty and predictability in the implementation of rules of ori-
gin. While a certain degree of political influence upon the pro-
cess of shaping new trade rules is unavoidable (and desirable in
some cases), the ensuing outcomes of such influences are unde-
sirable in the process of implementation of the existing legal
rules. The essential need to ensure the application of the ex-
isting rules of origin in a neutral and predictable way, leads to
the conclusion that the practical-trade approach should be pre-
ferred. The analysis of the EU practice in that regard reaffirms
the need to de-politicize rules of origin and enhance the degree
of certainty that is required for long-term development of inter-
national trade.
